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.1 Introduction
Media industries such as radio, TV, internet, newspapers, and magazines are major
drivers in popular culture, and they take up the lions share of peoplesleisure time.1
It is also a fact that most media rms rely on advertising to partially of fully nance
their activities. However, empirical evidence suggests that people dislike ads in
media products, at least on the margin, and worries have been raised over possible
excessive advertising in e.g. TV channels.2 This has lead European countries to
restrict the amount of TV commercials, and for a limited period of time some US
states imposed a tax on advertising in printed media.3 A tax on ads has also been
voiced in New Zealand (Allen et al., 2002) based on a nuisance argument. It is
surprising given the importance media products play in our lives that there exists
no formal analysis of pigouvian taxes on advertising. This is the topic of this paper.
The nuisance cost of advertising is likely to depend on the type of media prod-
ucts in which the advertising appears. One may for instance argue that readers
relatively easily can avoid ads in newspapers simply by skipping pages, whilst pro-
gram interruption on TV is more serious. This indicates that there is a relatively
strong negative correlation between the advertising volume in a TV channel and
the consumerswillingness to pay for watching it. The fact that commercial TV
channels historically nonetheless have relied almost exclusively on advertising rev-
1The average American watches over four hours of TV per day and the average European
watches closed to 3 hours and thirty minutes. See Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006) for further
empirical documentation of media usage.
2It is well documented that viewers try to avoid advertising breaks on TV, see Moriarty and
Everett (1994), Danaher (1995), and Wilbur (2008). For printed newspapers there are some in-
dications that the extent to which people consider commercials as bad varies across countries
(Gabszewicz et al., 2004).
3See ANA (2005) and the webpage by the American Advertising Federation (AAF):
http://www.aaf.org/ > government a¤airs.
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enue is presumably due to technological reasons; until recently it was di¢ cult for
TV channels to charge the viewers directly. However, this has changed with the
advent of digitalization of TV signals. Not surprisingly, we have therefore observed
a process where TV channels earn an increasingly large share of their revenue di-
rectly from the audience.4 TV channels as well as newspapers and magazines thus
operate in what is commonly described as two-sided markets - their business models
reect the fact that they depend on revenue from both the consumer market and
the advertising market.5
Standard economic theory prescribes that if advertising is disliked by the au-
dience (negative externality), the advertising volume can be optimally reduced by
levying a tax that reects the nuisance cost of ads. Thereby the government is able
to raise public tax revenue and correct for market failures with one and the same
instrument. This insight certainly raises the question of whether it would be a good
idea to replace the European system of quantity regulation on TV ads with correc-
tive revenue-raising taxes. However, we do not focus on this specic issue. Instead
we analyze more generally the e¤ects of taxing ads in media industries that operate
in two-sided markets.
The questions we ask are how a tax on ads changes media rmsmarket behav-
ior, to what extent they reduce the ad volume, and how the media consumers are
a¤ected. We nd that the traditional recommendation of imposing a tax on a good
that causes a negative externality (utility-reducing ads) does not necessarily allevi-
ate the negative externality. Rather it may actually aggravate it. In particular, we
4In the UK, for instance, TV channels made £ 2 bn in revenues from subscriptions in 2000, far
below the £ 3.6 bn in advertising revenue. In 2004, the revenues from subscription were £ 3.3 bn
while the revenues from advertising were £ 3.2 bn. See Ofcom (2005): The communication market
2005, section 1.4.3 at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/research/cm/cm05/overview05/nance/.
5Evans (2003) denes a two-sided market as one where we have (a) two distinct groups of
customers, (b) positive network externalities (at least from one of the customer groups to the
other), and (c) an intermediary that internalizes the externalities between the groups. See Rochet
and Tirole (2006) for a more formal denition.
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identify a number of situations in which ad-adverse consumers are negatively a¤ected
by the tax, and we even show that the tax may lead to higher ad volumes. This
unorthodox reaction to a tax may arise when consumers signicantly dislike ads, i.e.
in situations where the traditional arguments for corrective taxes are strongest.
It is only recently that rm behavior in two-sided markets has been formally
analyzed - see for instance Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), Armstrong (2006) and
the review by Rochet and Tirole (2006). The focus of these contributions is how
the two-sidedness of markets inuences the pricing decision of rms. The e¤ects of
taxation are masked out in these papers. Kind et al. (2008) discuss the issue of
taxation in two-sided markets but do not consider a tax on ads. Allen et al. (2002)
consider a tax on advertising, but resort to a one-sided market structure.6
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the model of a two-sided
media market, followed by an analysis of the e¤ects of ad taxes in section 3. Section
4 summarizes the results and o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a rm which sells a media product - which for simplicity we call news-
papers (good N) - to consumers at price pN and ad space (good A) to producers
at price pA. Let n and a denote the respective quantities of the two goods. Both
newspaper readers and advertisers are price takers, with inverse demand functions
being downward-sloping in own quantity; pNn  @pN=@n < 0; pAa  @pA=@a < 0. In
the sequel we further assume:
Assumption 1: pAn (a; n) > 0 and p
N
a (a; n) < 0:
With @pA=@n  pAn (a; n) > 0 we have made the reasonable assumption that the
willingness to pay for an ad is increasing in the number of newspaper readers, while
6See Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002 for a survey.
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pNa (a; n)  pNa < 0 means that the readerswillingness to pay for the newspaper is
decreasing in the ad-level. The latter implies that the audience is ad-averse.7
Note that with Assumption 1 we cannot consider advertising and newspapers
as complements in the usual sense, where a price reduction of one good leads to
more sales of both goods. On the contrary, if the media rm reduces the price of
advertising in order to sell more of that good, it will have to accept lower sales of
the newspaper, other things being equal.
An ad-valorem tax (t) is levied on ads, which implies that the newspaper receives
the net price pA= (1 + t) per advertisement. The tax rate t may deviate from the
general VAT rate; which for simplicity we set equal to zero. The prot level of the
newspaper is given by
 =
pA(a; n)a
1 + t
+ pN(a; n)n  k (a; n) ; (1)
where k (a; n) is the cost function, with ki  0 (i = a; n) and kij R 0 (i 6= j).8
The media rm maximizes prot with respect to sales of newspapers and adver-
tising space. We presuppose that the second-order conditions for prot maximization
hold; aa < 0; nn < 0; and H  aann   2an > 0.
From (1) we nd that the rst-order condition for the newspapers advertising
volume (a = 0) reads
pA + pAa a
1 + t| {z }
MRa
= ka   pNa n:| {z }
PMCa
(2)
The left-hand side of equation (2) measures the marginal revenue on the adver-
tising side of the market of selling ads (MRa), and this term should be set equal to
marginal cost (ka) in a standard one-sided market. However, a one-unit increase in
7All the equations that follow go through independently of the sign of pNa .
8Intuitively, one might expect that the marginal cost of printed newspapers is increasing in the
ad-volume, and vice versa (so that kan > 0). However, there may also exist some cost synergies,
which means that kan < 0: Since our theoretical results go through in either case, we leave the
sign of kan unspecied.
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the ad-level means that the willingness to pay for the newspaper falls by pNa units.
With n newspaper readers, this represents a loss equal to pNa n for the media rm.
We may therefore interpret the sum of the actual marginal costs ka and the exter-
nality term  pNa n > 0 as the newspapers perceived marginal costs of advertising
(PMCa); that is, PMCa  ka pNa n. Equation (2) simply says that these perceived
marginal costs are equal to marginal revenue in optimum. Since PMCa > ka if the
newspaper readers dislike ads, the rst-order condition implies that the media rm
sells a lower ad-volume than what maximizes prots on the ad-side of the market.
Setting n = 0 we further nd that
pN + pNn n| {z }
MRn
= kn   p
A
na
1 + t
;| {z }
PMCn
(3)
which has a similar interpretation to that of equation (2): the marginal revenue
on the newspaper side of the market (MRn) should be set equal to the perceived
marginal costs of selling a newspaper (PMCn). These perceived costs will be smaller
than the actual marginal costs (PMCn < kn) if a larger newspaper circulation
increases the willingness to pay for ads. This is captured by the term pAna= (1 + t) 
0:
From (2) and (3) it follows that:
Lemma 1: Ceteris paribus, an increase in the ad-valorem tax on ads reduces
the marginal revenue of selling ads (@MRa=@t < 0) and increases the perceived
marginal costs of selling newspapers (@PMCn=@t > 0).
Note that PMCn < 0 if kn is su¢ ciently small compared to pAna. This may
for instance be the case with television and electronic newspapers, where marginal
costs are approximately equal to zero. However, PMCa must certainly be positive
if consumers dislike ads, even in cases where ka = 0:
The interrelationship between the two sides of the market is illustrated in Figure
1, where we have set marginal costs equal to zero. The left-hand side panel shows
6
the prots in the reader market from selling newspapers, N = pNn; while the right-
hand panel shows the prots in the advertising market from selling ads, A = p
Aa
1+t
:
If the advertisers did not care about the number of readers and the readers did
not care about the number of ads, the newspaper would maximize prot by setting
n = argmaxN and a = argmaxA. However, with pAn > 0 and p
N
a < 0 rst-
order conditions (2) and (3) imply that, other things equal, we have nopt > n and
aopt < a.
n
n* n opt
a
a opt a*
(PA)*
PAP
N
(PN)*
Figure 1: Implications of the rst-order conditions.
3 Tax responses
Standard welfare economics tells us to tax a good which imposes a negative exter-
nality.9 By assuming that pNa < 0 we have thus tilted the model such that taxation
of ads at the outset should have a positive welfare e¤ect. Below, we show that this
does not necessarily hold in a two-sided market.
First-order conditions (2) and (3) make it clear that equilibrium prices and quan-
tities on both sides of the market depend on the tax rate on ads. Di¤erentiating
pA = pA(a(t); n(t)) and pN = pN(a(t); n(t)) with respect to t we nd that the price
9If pAn and/or p
N
a are di¤erent from zero we have externalities between the customer groups.
The reason is that price-taking producers and consumers do not take into account the e¤ect of
their actions on the demand in either side of the market.
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changes subsequent to a tax increase are given by
dpA
dt
= pAa
da
dt
+ pAn
dn
dt
and
dpN
dt
= pNn
dn
dt
+ pNa
da
dt
: (4)
By totally di¤erentiating rst order conditions (2) and (3) we further have
da
dt
=
1
H (1 + t)

MRann +
pAna
1 + t
( an)

(5)
and
dn
dt
=
1
H (1 + t)

pAna
1 + t
aa +MRa ( an)

: (6)
The sign of an  @2= (@a@n) turns out to be of particular relevance for the
tax analysis, and by using equations (1) - (3) we nd
an = p
N
a [1 + "n] + p
A
n (1 + t)
 1 [1 + "a]  kan; (7)
where "n  npNa
@pNa
@n
and "a  apAn
@pAn
@a
:
The cross derivative an measures how the marginal protability of selling news-
papers , n; changes if the advertising volume increases. One might think that an
is negative, given the assumption that the willingness to pay for the newspaper is
decreasing in the advertising volume (pNa < 0): However, if the elasticity of p
N
a with
respect to n is smaller than minus one ("n <  1); the rst term in (7) is positive.
The interpretation of the second term in (7) is similar; this term is positive for
pAn > 0 if "a >  1: Clearly, we might therefore have an > 0; and we are not aware
of any empirical studies which can help us determine the sign. We shall therefore
consider both the case an  0 and an < 0:
4 A tax on ads when an  0
When an  0; the marginal protability of newspaper sales is increasing in the
ad-volume. We shall start this section by assuming that an = 0: In this case an
increase in t unambiguously leads to a lower advertising volume (da=dt < 0), since
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the media rms marginal revenue of selling ads falls. Formally, this can be seen
from equation (5), which now simplies to
da
dt

an=0
=
nn
H (1 + t)
MRa < 0: (8)
By taxing ads, the government is thus able to reduce the ad volume in the
newspaper. Other things equal, this makes the newspaper more attractive for the
consumers. However, this does not imply that output of newspapers increases. On
the contrary, from equation (6) we nd
dn
dt

an=0
=
aa
H (1 + t)2
pAna < 0: (9)
The intuition for why dn=dt < 0 is clear from Lemma 1: a higher tax rate on ads
increases the perceived marginal cost of selling newspapers.10 Thus, it is optimal to
reduce output.
The negative quantity e¤ects of a higher tax on ads are magnied ifan > 0, since
a smaller newspaper circulation then reduces the marginal protability of selling
ads and vice versa. This can be veried by noting that the last terms in the square
bracket of (5) and (6) are negative when an > 0: We can therefore state:
Proposition 1: Suppose that an  0. A higher ad-valorem tax on ads reduces
sales of both ads and newspapers.
Next, consider how an increase in t a¤ects the end-user prices on the two sides
of the market. The direct e¤ect of a smaller sale of newspapers is to increase the
price of newspapers (since the demand curve is assumed to be downward-sloping).
Additionally, the willingness to pay for newspapers increases since the ad-volume is
reduced. From equation (4) we therefore nd dpN=dt > 0:
10From (3) we have kn   PMCn = p
A
na
1+t > 0: Substituting for
pAna
1+t into (9) we can write
dn
dt

an=0
= aa
H(1+t)2
(kn   PMCn) < 0:
9
The e¤ect on the price of ads is ambiguous. The own-price e¤ect suggests that
the price increases, while the fact that newspaper sales fall suggests a lower price.
The net e¤ect depends on which of these e¤ects dominates, such that dpA=dt Q 0:
We can state:
Proposition 2: Suppose that an  0. A higher ad-valorem tax on ads increases
the price of newspapers, while the e¤ect on the price of ads is ambiguous.
Somewhat surprisingly, and in sharp contrast to results in one-sided markets,
Proposition 2 shows that the end-user price of the more heavily taxed good might
fall. The end-user price of the good where the tax rate is unchanged, on the other
hand, increases.
5 Monopoly vs. duopoly with an  0
Above we only considered a monopoly newspaper in order to make the general
analysis tractable. To gain some extra insight and to show that the results survive
under competition, we shall now illustrate the ndings above in a simple duopoly
model. Using the same media model as in Kind et al (2007), we assume that the
consumers have the following utility function:
U =
2X
i=1
ni  
24(1  s) 2X
i=1
n2i
2
+ s
 
2X
i=1
ni
2
!235 ; i = 1; 2: (10)
The variable ni in equation (10) denotes consumption of newspaper i = 1; 2;
while the parameter s 2 [0; 1] measures how di¤erentiated the newspapers are; from
the readers point of view they are completely unrelated if s = 0 (so that each
newspaper behaves as a monopoly), while they are considered as perfect substitutes
if s = 1: More generally, the readers perceive the newspapers as closer substitutes
the higher s is.11
11The Shubik-Levitan (1980) formulation in equation (10) ensures that the parameter s only
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Each consumer has to make a direct payment pNi  0 per copy of newspaper i.
Consistent with Assumption 1 we further presuppose that the newspaper readers
are negatively a¤ected by commercials. The willingness to pay for newspaper i is
consequently decreasing in its advertising level; @pNi =@ai =  , where  is a positive
parameter. The higher ; the greater is the consumersdisutility of advertising. The
consumer surplus from reading the newspapers is thus equal to
CS = U  
2X
i=1
 
pNi + ai

ni:
Maximizing consumer surplus with respect to consumption of the two newspapers
generates the inverse demand function
pNi = 1  (2  s)ni=2  ai   snj=2 (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j): (11)
Consumer-good producers advertise in newspaper i if the benet of doing so
is larger than the cost. A producers gross gain from advertising in newspaper i is
naturally increasing in its advertising level (ai) and in the number of readers exposed
to its advertising (ni). We make it simple by assuming that the gross gain equals
aini. With a price per ad equal to pAi ; the net gain from advertising is
 =
 
2X
i=1
aini
!
 
 
2X
i=1
pAi ai
!
: (12)
Without a¤ecting the qualitative results, we assume that there is only one advertiser.
Solving fa1; a2g = argmax  subject to (11) we nd that the inverse demand curve
for ads in newspaper i equals
pAi = 1 
(2  s)  pNi + 2ai  s  pNj + 2aj
2 (1  s) (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j). (13)
The willingness to pay for an ad in newspaper i is thus decreasing in its advertising
volume (@pAi =@a < 0) and in the consumer price of the newspaper (@p
A
i =@p
N
i < 0):
captures product di¤erentiation and not the size of the market. This is in contrast to the standard
quadratic utility function, where one and the same parameter measures both product di¤erentiation
and market size. See Motta (2004) for details.
11
The reason for the latter is that a higher newspaper price tends to reduce newspaper
circulation, thereby making advertising less attractive. Since the two newspapers
compete in the reader market if s > 0; equation (13) further shows that the willing-
ness to pay for ads in newspaper i is increasing in the advertising level and price of
newspaper j:
Analogously to equation (1), the prot level of newspaper i equals
i =
pAi ai
1 + t
+ pNi ni   k(ai; ni): (14)
Since the purpose of this example is to illustrate the consequences of taxing
ads when the marginal protability of newspaper sales is increasing in the ad level
(an  @2i@ni@ai > 0), we shall for simplicity set k = 0: We then have
an =
1
1 + t
   > 0: (15)
The assumption that k = 0 is not critical, as long as the costs are not so high as
to make an < 0:
Solving fai; nig = argmaxi simultaneously for the two media rms, we nd
a unique symmetric equilibrium. Omitting subscripts, output of newspapers and
advertising is given by
n =
2 (4  3s)
D1
and a =
4 (1   (1 + t)) (1  s)
D1
. (16)
In the Appendix we show that the denominatorD1 is positive when the second-order
conditions and the non-negativity constraints are satised:
For comparison between conventional markets (one-sided markets) and two-sided
markets the following may now be noted:
Remark 1: Assume a one-sided market structure ( pAn = p
N
a = 0). Prices,
output, and welfare are then independent of the VAT rate if k = 0:
The intuition for the results in Remark 1 is that ad-valorem taxes work as pure
prot taxes in one-sided markets if marginal costs are zero (k = 0), making the
12
rmsprot maximizing prices and outputs independent of t. This is true whether
we have perfect or imperfect competition. If ka > 0; on the other hand, the rms
marginal costs would be increasing in the tax level, in which case we would have
dpAn=dt > 0 and da=dt < 0:
5.1 Monopoly
When analyzing the tax responses in a two-sided market structure, we conne our-
selves to considering the consequences of a small tax increase from t = 0: We start
out by setting s = 0; such that the newspapers are monopolies in each of their
market segments. In the Appendix we show that non-negative prices require that
 2 (1=3; 1) : If   1=3, consumers have so little aversion against ads that the me-
dia rms prefer to give the newspapers away for free to the consumers. In this case
their whole prot originates from the ad market. Conversely, if   1; consumers
have such a negative attitude towards ads that the media rm maximizes prots by
setting ai = 0: In this case its entire revenue is derived from the reader market.
Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to t we nd that the quantity changes subse-
quent to a tax increase from t = 0 are given by
da
dt

t=0
=  1 + 5
2   2
D21
< 0 and
dn
dt

t=0
=  2 (1  
2)
D21
< 0: (17)
By inserting for (16) into (11) and (13) we further have
dpA
dt

t=0
=   2   7
2 + 1
D21
< 0 for  <  

1 + 2
p
2

=7 (18)
and
dpN
dt

t=0
= 
3 (1 + 2)  2
D21
> 0:
Figure 2 illustrates equations (17) and (18) graphically. Consistent with Propo-
sition 1, sales of both advertising and newspapers fall subsequent to a higher tax.
Note also that if  <   0:55; then the end-user price of newspapers, where the
tax rate is unchanged, increases, while the end-user price of advertising, where the
tax rate has increased, falls: This is consistent with Proposition 2.
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The reason why dpA=dt

t=0
< 0 for  <  is that if the readers do not care
much about the ad-volume, the media rm will sell a large amount of newspaper
copies in order to generate a high income from the ad-market. This incentive is
signicantly reduced if ads are taxed. Thus, there will be a big drop in newspaper
sales. This reduces the willingness to pay for ads, leading to a fall in the ad price.
Only for  >  is the own-price e¤ect so strong that the reduced supply of ad space
increases the price of ads.
-1.2
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=
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0.33 0.53 0.73 0.93
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d n
d t =
0
N
t
dp
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=
g
Figure 2: Price and quantity responses.
Figure 2 veries that price and quantity responses to higher taxes in two-sided
markets may di¤er qualitatively from those we nd in one-sided market. A second
deviation from standard results in one-sided markets, is that even a small tax on
a good with negative externalities (advertising) may have negative welfare conse-
quences. To see this, we dene welfare in the usual way as the sum of consumer
surplus, prot, and tax revenue (T ) :
W = CS + 2 +  + T;
where T = t
1+t
 
2pAa

:
From the envelope theorem it follows that the tax revenue of increasing the
tax rate marginally from t = 0 is equal to the prot losses of the media rms;
d(1+2)
dt

t=0
=   dT
dt

t=0
: This means that dW
dt

t=0
= dCS
dt

t=0
+ d
dt

t=0
: By using
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equations (11) and (13) we nd the following simple expressions for consumer surplus
and prot for the advertiser:12
CS = n2 and  = 2a2:
From this we immediately see that
dCS
dt

t=0
= 2n
dn
dt

t=0
< 0 and
d
dt

t=0
= 4 a
da
dt

t=0
< 0: (19)
It thus follows that for all  2 (1=3; 1) we have
dW
dt

t=0
=  2 (1  ) (1 + 7
2)
D31
< 0:
Even though advertising imposes a negative externality on the newspaper readers,
a higher tax on ads consequently has a negative e¤ect on consumer surplus and
welfare. There are two reasons for this somewhat paradoxical result. First, a higher
tax on advertising increases the perceived marginal costs of selling newspapers, as
stated in Lemma 1. This e¤ect is present independent of the sign of an: Second,
if an > 0 the lower output of newspapers reduces the marginal protability of
selling ads, which again reduces the marginal protability of selling newspapers. In
this sense a higher tax on ads leads to a vicious circle where output contractions of
newspapers and ads mutually reinforce each other.
5.2 Duopoly
So far we have assumed that s = 0; which means that each media rm has monopoly
power in its own market segment. All the qualitative results above survive as long as
the consumers perceive the media products as imperfect substitutes. In particular,
the rms will use their market power to shift part of the tax burden over to the
consumers and the advertisers if s < 1 (contrary to what they would be able to do
12The equation  = a2 might leave the counterintuitive impression that the advertisers prot
level is increasing in : However, this is not correct, since the ad volume is decreasing in the readers
disutility of ads. We consequently nd dd =   2(1 (1+t))(1+(1+t))
3
N3(1+t) 2 < 0:
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in a one-sided market with k = 0): The ability to do so is smaller the more ercly the
rms compete, though. This is most obvious if we use equation (16) and consider
the consequences of a small tax increase from t = 0 on output:
dn
dt

t=0
=  8 (1  s)  (1  
2) (4  3s)
D21
< 0 (20)
da
dt

t=0
=  4 (1  s) 4 (1 + 5
2   2) (1  s) + 3s22
D21
< 0:
Equation (20) shows that sales of both newspapers and advertising space fall
subsequent to an increase in t as long as there is imperfect competition between the
rms: However, as s ! 1 we have dn=dt = da=dt ! 0: The reason for this is that
the consumers perceive the newspapers as perfect substitutes at s = 1; implying
that the media rms have no market power. Then the advertising tax works as
a pure surplus tax, just as in a one-sided market (with no distortionary e¤ects).
Thus, it is only in the limit case where the rms produce perfect substitutes that
the consequences of a tax increase are the same in one-sided and two-sided markets.
Before ending this section, it is useful to analyze what happens to pA under
duopoly if the government introduces a small tax on advertising. It turns out that
the price e¤ect is ambiguous also with (imperfect) competition between the media
rms. This is illustrated on the left-hand side panel of Figure 3, which shows the
combinations of s and  where dpA=dt = 0: For s = 0 the rms have monopoly
power, in which case we have seen that each media rm will reduce the advertising
price if  <  = 0:56; and increase the advertising price if  > : However, the
media rmsability to increase the advertising price subsequent to a tax increase is
smaller the closer substitutes the media products are. This explains why the curve
in the Figure is upward-sloping. Indeed, as we approach s = 1 the media rms will
have no ability to increase the advertising price.
The Figure indicates that there is a complex relationship between the extent
of competition and the change in the advertising price as the tax increases. For a
given value of  it might for instance be true that two monopolies prefer to increase
the advertising price, while the opposite holds for two competing rms. This is
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illustrated on the right-hand side of Figure 3, where we have set  = 6=10: For
s 2 [0; 72) we have dpA=dt
t=0
> 0; while dpA=dt

t=0
< 0 for s 2 (0:72; 1:0) : Note
also that in the limit s = 1 we must have dpA=dt

t=0
= 0; since the tax then works
as a pure surplus tax.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
dpA/dt < 0
dpA/dt > 0
g
s
s
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
dpA/dt
Figure 3: Tax responses and competition.
6 A tax on ads when an < 0
When an < 0; the marginal protability of newspaper sales is decreasing in the ad-
volume. Contrary to the results above, it is then not necessarily true that a higher
ad-valorem tax on ads reduces sales on both sides of the market: It may actually be
the case that output of either ads or newspapers increases. Equations (5) and (6),
which for the sake of convenience we repeat here, make this clear:
da
dt
=
1
H (1 + t)
2664MRann| {z }
 
+
pAna
1 + t
( an)| {z }
+
3775 (21)
dn
dt
=
1
H (1 + t)
2664 pAna1 + taa| {z }
 
+MRa ( an)| {z }
+
3775
The rst term in the square brackets of (21) is always negative, but the second term
is positive if an < 0. The total e¤ect is thus ambiguous. However, in the Appendix
we prove the following result:
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Proposition 3. Suppose an < 0: A higher ad-valorem tax on ads reduces sales
on one side of the market, and may increase sales on the other side. The following
combinations are possible:
(i) da=dt  0 and dn=dt 7 0:
(ii) da=dt > 0 and dn=dt < 0:
If sales of one good drop, the marginal protability of selling the other good
increases when na < 0. This explains why output of the two goods may move in
opposite directions, as stated in Proposition 3. Due to the ambiguity of the quantity
e¤ects, it is clear that also the price responses (4) are ambiguous.
The last part of Proposition 3 is surprising, as it states that the ad-volume may
increase following a rise in the ad tax. We shall below demonstrate that this result
occurs when the readers disutility from ads is su¢ ciently high. We do this by
looking at a simple example which encompasses both monopoly and duopoly.
7 Monopoly vs. duopoly with an < 0
In Section 5 we showed that the media rmspossibility of shifting the tax burden
over to consumers and advertisers is smaller the less di¤erentiated the consumers
perceive the media products to be (as measured by the parameter s). It can be
shown that the e¤ects of an increase in s (reduced newspaper di¤erentiation) are
the same in the example we shall now look at. For simplicity we therefore set s = 0:
This means that we can simplify equation (11), which expresses consumer demand
for the two media products, to
pNi = 1  ai   ni: (22)
We thus have a standard downward-sloping linear demand curve for newspapers,
where the willingness to pay for a newspaper is decreasing in the ad volume if  > 0:
For simplicity we further assume that we can linearize demand for ads around the
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equilibrium point to
pAi = 1  ai + ni   haj: (23)
The willingness to pay for an ad is thus decreasing in the ad volume and increasing in
the size of the readership. The inclusion of the parameter h 2 [0; 1] in equation (23)
is inspired by Godes et al (2008), and measures to what extent the two newspapers
compete in the advertising market. If h = 0 each newspaper has monopoly power
in the advertising market, while they are perceived as perfect substitutes if h = 1:
The media rmsprot functions are the same as in Example 1 (c.f. equation
(12)), but to ensure that an < 0 as simple as possible we specify the cost function
as ki = aini + ni=2: We now have
an =  t (1 + ) + 
1 + t
< 0: (24)
The newspapers solve fai; nig = argmaxi simultaneously. Omitting subscripts,
the rst-order conditions for a symmetric equilibrium are given by
a = (1 + t)
4  t   (1 + t)
2D2
and n =
2  (1 + t) (2   h)
2D2
: (25)
The denominator D2 is positive whenever the second-order conditions and non-
negativity constraints hold (see Appendix).
Before analyzing the consequences of a tax increase in this two-sided market, it
is useful to note the following:
Remark 2: Assume that the markets are one-sided ( pAn = p
N
a = 0). If h = 0;
prices, output and welfare are independent of the VAT rate. If h > 0; then dai=dt <
0 and dni=dt > 0:
The results in Remark 2 are proved in the Appendix. If h = 0 we have the same
result as in Example 1: the VAT on ads works as a pure surplus tax, with no e¤ect
on output and prices: However, if h > 0 the rms will compete in the advertising
market, and this competition will be stronger the larger h is. A higher value of
h therefore makes it optimal for the rms to reduce production of the A good
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and increase production of the N good, and more so the higher the VAT rate.
Since the demand curves are downward-sloping, this further implies dpA=dt > 0 and
dpN=dt < 0:
7.1 Monopoly
As in Section 5, we start out by considering the monopoly case. In the present
case this amounts to setting h = 0; and it can be shown that all non-negativity
constraints and second-order conditions hold for  2 (0; 1) : From equation (25) we
now have:
dn
dt

t=0
=   2  2 + 
2
D22 ( + 2)
 1 < 0 and
da
dt

t=0
=
3   2
2D22 ( + 2)
 1 Q 0: (26)
The reason why newspaper sales fall, is that a higher tax on ads increases the
perceived marginal costs of selling newspapers (c.f. Lemma 1). The drop in news-
paper sales in turn raises the marginal protability of selling ads, and (26) shows
that da=dt > 0 if  > 2=3: It is thus when the readersdisutility from ads is su¢ -
ciently large that a higher tax on ads leads to more advertising. This is illustrated in
Figure 4, which also shows that the advertising price (inclusive of taxes) falls when
t increases. This is due to the fact that the willingness to pay for ads is reduced
because the newspaper circulation falls (dn=dt < 0).
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Figure 4: Taxing ads. Consequences for advertising prices and sales volume.
The intuition behind the quantity changes in Figure 4 is as follows. If the con-
sumers dislike ads, the newspaper maximizes prot by having a lower advertising
volume than that which maximizes prots on the ad-side of the market. This e¤ect
is stronger the larger  is; such that the incentive to "underprovide" ads is more
pronounced the more the consumers dislike ads. A higher tax reduces newspaper
sales, and thus increases the marginal protability of selling ads when an < 0: It
follows that the media rm has stronger incentives to increase the advertising volume
subsequent to a higher VAT on ads the larger  is:13 This explains why da=dt > 0
for su¢ ciently high values of :
Also in this example newspaper readers are adversely a¤ected by a tax on ads,
but interestingly the advertisers might benet. This is true if da=dt > 0: It can
further be shown that
dW
dt

t=0
=  16  30 + 15
2   43
2D22 (2  )
is positive for  2 (0:77; 1:0) : For su¢ ciently high values of  we thus nd that
a small tax on ads increases welfare. However, this is not because the tax leads
to reduced output of the good which imposes a negative externality, but on the
contrary because output of that good increases. This turns standard insight from
welfare analysis upside-down.
7.2 Duopoly
If h > 0 the media rms compete in the advertising market (but not in the reader
market, since we have set s = 0): In the Appendix we show that newspaper sales fall
(dn=dt < 0) and newspaper prices increase (dpN=dt > 0) subsequent to a higher tax
13Mathematically, this can be seen by using equation (7) to nd anjt=0 = pAn      kan. Since
d anjt=0 =d < 0; a given reduction of newspaper sales leads to a larger increase in the marginal
protability of selling ads the higher  is:
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on ads for all h 2 [0; 1] : These responses are the opposite of those we would have
in a one-sided market, as noted in Remark 2. The responses in the advertising side
of the market are more ambiguous, and depend on the value of h. In particular, for
h = 0 we found that it is optimal for the newspapers to sell more ads if the tax rate
on ads increases and  > 2=3. The same is not necessarily true if the newspapers
compete in the advertising market. The reason for this is that the larger h is; the
less market power each newspaper will have in the advertising market, and the less
protable it is to sell more advertising space if the tax rate on ads increases. In
Figure 5 we have assumed that  = 4=5: At h = 0 we therefore have da=dt > 0;
but if the competitive pressure in the advertising market becomes su¢ ciently strong
(h > 14=45 t 0:3) each newspaper will optimally respond with da=dt < 0: This in
turn implies that the tendency to reduce the advertising price subsequent to the tax
increase is less pronounced the larger is h:
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Figure 5: Competition and tax responses on the ad-side.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have made use of recent advances in the theory of Industrial Orga-
nization to analyze how a tax on advertising may work. The starting point of the
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analysis is that readers/viewers perceive ads as a nuisance. Standard theory would
in this case prescribe a tax on ads that makes the rms internalize the negative
externalities. However, standard theory neglects the linkages that exist between
the rmscustomer groups. Including these linkages in the analysis, we nd that a
tax on ads may be counterproductive. First, it is not obvious that the advertising
volume will fall. Indeed, the opposite may happen if media consumers have su¢ -
ciently strong negative attitudes towards ads. Second, even if the advertising volume
should fall, the tax may have negative welfare e¤ects. In particular, a tax on ads will
reduce the media rmsincentives to make high advertising revenue by setting low
consumer prices (so as to attract large audiences). We have thus identied a number
of situations in which the consumers will be negatively a¤ected by such a tax. This
serves to show how important it is to understand the business model of platform
rms. Tax policy does not work in a conventional way in two-sided markets.
In our analysis we have abstracted from taxation on the consumer side of the
market (most European countries do for instance have VAT on consumer payments
to TV channels, and some have VAT on newspaper sales). This is an innocent
abstraction as long as we only consider possible corrective rationales for taxing ads.
However, in policy analysis where governments also have scal motives for taxing
ads it might be important to include tax e¤ects on the consumer side. The reason
is that it is a-priori ambiguous what will happen to tax revenue on this side of the
market if the media rmsresponse to a tax on ads is to raise the consumer price
and reduce output. In Europe, the higher price would have a positive e¤ect on
VAT revenue from the consumers, while the lower output would have a negative
e¤ect. This ambiguity should clearly also be taken into account in the discussion of
including advertising services in the US sales tax system.14
14US state legislators repeatedly discuss and implement an ad tax. See the webpage by the
American Advertising Federation (http://www.aaf.org/ > government a¤airs) for more informa-
tion.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Calculation of Example 1
Dene D1  3 (8 (1  s) + s2)    4 (2 + (1 + t) 2) (1 + t) (1  s) : Using equations
(11), (13) and (14) we nd @
21
@n21
< 0; @
21
@a21
< 0 and
H 

@21
@n21

@21
@a21

 

@21
@n1@a1
2
=
D1 + s
2
4 (1  s) (1 + t) :
A su¢ cient condition for H to be positive, and thus for the second-order conditions
to holds, is that D1 > 0:
Inserting for (11) and (13) into (16) we have
pN =
 (12  14s+ 3s2) (t+ 1)  4 (1  s)
D1 (1 + t)
and (27)
pA = 2
2  s+ 2 (t+ 1) (1  s)
D1
:
From (27) we nd
dpN
dt

t=0
= 4 (1  s) 4 (1  s) (3  2) + 12 (1  s) 
2 + 2s (1  2) + 3s22
D21
> 0
and
dpA
dt

t=0
=  4 (1  s) 4 (2   7
2 + 1)  3s22   (8 + 2  262) s
D21
T 0:
The newspaper price is thus increasing in the tax on ads, while the price response
on ads is ambiguous. The upward-sloping curve in Figure 3 is found by setting
dpA
dt

t=0
= 0:
Note from (27) that both pA and pN are non-negative for s = t = 0 i¤  2
[1=3; 1] :Q:E:D:
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9.2 Example 2: One sided markets
With one-sided markets and s = 0 we have pNi = 1   ni and pAi = 1   ai   haj:
Solving fai; nig = i simultaneously for the two rms we nd (omitting subscripts):
a =
3  t
2 (3  t+ 2h) and n =
h
2 (3  t+ 2h) : (28)
This yields the following quantity responses subsequent to a tax increase:
da
dt
=   h
(3  t+ 2h)2 < 0 and
dn
dt
=
h
2 (3  t+ 2h)2 > 0
By inserting for (28) into the demand functions we further nd
dpA
@t
= h
1 + h
(3  t+ 2h)2 > 0 and
dpN
dt
=   h
2 (3  t+ 2h)2 < 0:
Q.E.D.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Note that H  aann   2an > 0 which, when an < 0, implies
aa
an
>
an
nn
> 0:
Rearranging both derivatives in (21), while using the above inequality, proves both
statements in Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
9.4 Calculation of Example 2
Dene D2 = 2 (2 + h) (1 + t)  ( (1 + t) + t)2 : Using equations (14), (11), and (23)
we nd @
21
@n21
< 0; @
21
@a21
< 0 and
H 

@21
@n21

@21
@a21

 

@21
@n1@a1
2
=
D2   2h (1 + t)
4 (1  s) (1 + t) :
A su¢ cient condition for H to be positive, and thus for the second-order conditions
to hold, is that D2   2h (1 + t) > 0: This is ensured in the numerical example.
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From (25) we have the following quantity responses to a higher VAT on ads:
da
dt

t=0
=
3   2
2D22 ( + 2)
 1  
2h ( + 1)
2D22
and
dn
dt

t=0
=   2  2 + 
2
D22 ( + 2)
 1  
h
 
5  ( + 1)2
2D22
:
Inserting for the equilibrium quantities into the demand functions and di¤erentiating
we further have:
dpN
dt

t=0
=
4  2   2
2D22 ( + 2)
 1 +
2 + 4
2D22
h and
dpA
dt

t=0
=   2   + 2
2
2D22 ( + 2)
 1 +
h ( + 1) (h   + 1)
D22
:
Q.E.D.
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